ement to
Massena on the Mincio. Equally skilful was Napoleon's action as
regards Hanover. On that side also the allies planned a formidable
expedition. From the fortress of Stralsund in Swedish Pomerania, a
force of Russians and Swedes, which Gustavus burned to command, was to
march into Hanover, and, when strengthened by an Anglo-Hanoverian
corps, drive the French from the Low Countries. It is curious to
contrast the cumbrous negotiations concerning this expedition--the
quarrels about the command, the anxiety at the outset lest Villeneuve
should perhaps sail into the Baltic, the delays of the British War
Office, the remonstrances of the Czar, and the efforts to avert the
jealousy of Prussia--with the serene indifference of Napoleon as to
the whole affair. He knew full well that the war would not be decided
by diversions at the heel of Italy or on the banks of the Ems, but by
the shock of great masses of men on the Danube. He denuded Hanover of
French troops, except at its southern fortress of Hameln, so that he
could overwhelm the levies of Austria before the Russians came up. In
brief, while the Coalition sought, like a Briareus, to envelop him on
all sides, he prepared to deal a blow at its heart.

As the first part of the campaign depended almost entirely on problems
of time and space, it will be well to follow the chief movements of
the hostile forces somewhat closely. The Austrian plan aimed at
forestalling the French in the occupation of Swabia; and its apparent
success puffed up Mack with boundless confidence. At Ulm he threw up
extensive outworks to strengthen that obsolete fortress, extended his
lines to Memmingen far on the south, and trusted that the Muscovites
would come up long before the French eagles hovered above the sources
of the Danube. But at that time the Russian vanguard had not reached
Linz in Upper Austria, and not before October 10th did it appear on
the banks of the River Inn.[25]

Far from being the last to move, the French Emperor outstripped his
enemies in the speed of his preparations. Whereas the Austrians
believed he would not be able to reach the Danube in force before
November 10th, he intended to have 200,000 men in Germany by September
18th. But he knew not at first the full extent of his good fortune: it
did not occur to him that the Austrians would cross the Inn: all he
asks Talleyrand, on August 23rd, is that such news may appear in the
"Moniteur" as will gain him twenty days an