ell into our hands was in great measure the
fruit of Nelson's victory, which heralded the second and vaster stage
of imperial growth.

Finally, the decisive advantage which Britain now gained over Napoleon
at sea compelled him, if he would realize the world-wide schemes ever
closest to his heart, to adopt the method of warfare against us which
he had all along contemplated as an effective alternative. As far back
as February, 1798, he pointed out that there were three ways of
attacking and ruining England, either a direct invasion, or a French
control of North Germany which would ruin British commerce, or an
expedition to the Indies. After Trafalgar the first of these
alternatives was impossible, and the last receded for a time into the
background. The second now took the first place in his thoughts; he
could only bring England to his feet and gain a world-empire by
shutting out her goods from the whole of the Continent, and thus
condemning her to industrial strangulation. In a word, Trafalgar
necessitated the adoption of the Continental System, which was built
up by the events now to be described.

Note to the Third Edition.--An American critic has charged me with
inconsistency in saying that the Third Coalition was not built up
by English gold, because I state (p. 5) that the first advances
were made by England to Russia. I ought to have used the phrase
"the first _written_ proposals that I have found were made," etc.
Czartoryski's "Memoirs" (vol. ii., chs. ii.-iii.), to which I
referred my readers for details, show clearly that Alexander and
his advisers looked on a rupture with France as inevitable, but
wished to temporize for some three months or so, until certain
matters were cleared up; they therefore cautiously sounded the
position at Vienna and London. This passage from Czartoryski (vol.
ii., ch. iii.) proves that Russia wanted the English alliance:

"After the diplomatic rupture consequent upon the execution of the
Duc d'Enghien, it became indispensable to come to an understanding
with the only Power, except Russia, which thought herself strong
enough to contend with France--to ascertain as thoroughly as
possible what were her inclinations and designs, the principles of
her policy, and those which she could be led to adopt in certain
contingencies. It would have been a great advantage to obtain the
concurrence in our views of so