rey.
On October 6th the corps of Soult and Lannes, helped by Murat's
powerful cavalry, cut the Austrian lines on the Danube at Donauwoerth,
and gained a firm footing on the right bank. Over the crossing thus
secured far in Mack's rear, the French poured in dense array, and
marched south and south-west towards the back of the Austrian
positions, while Ney's corps marched to seize the chief bridges over
the Danube.
A study of the processes of Mack's brain at this time is not without
interest. It shows the danger of intrusting the fate of an army to a
man who cannot weigh evidence. Mack was not ignorant of the course of
events, though his news generally came late. The mischief was that his
brain warped the news. On October 6th he wrote to Vienna that the
enemy seemed about to aim a blow at his communications: on October
7th, when he heard of the loss of Donauwoerth, he described it as an
unfortunate event, which no one thought to be possible. The Archduke
now urged the need of an immediate retreat towards Munich, and marched
in an easterly direction on Guenzburg: another Austrian division of
8,000 men moved on Wertingen, where, on October 8th, it was furiously
attacked by the troops of Murat and Lannes. At first the Imperialists
firmly kept their ranks; but the unequal contest closed with a hasty
flight, which left 2,000 men in the hands of the French Then Murat,
pressing on through the woods, cut off Mack's retreat to Augsburg. Yet
that general still took a cheerful view of his position. On that same
day he wrote from Guenzburg that, as soon as the enemy had passed over
the Lech, he would cross the Danube and cut their communications at
Noerdlingen. He wrote thus when Ney's corps was striving to seize the
Danube bridges below Ulm. If Mack were to march north-east against the
French communications it was of the utmost importance for him to hold
the chief of these bridges: but Ney speedily seized three of them, and
on the 9th was able to draw closer the toils around Ulm.
From his position at Augsburg the French Emperor now directed the
final operations; and, as before Marengo, he gave most heed to that
side by which he judged his enemy would strive to break through, in
this case towards Kempten and Tyrol. This would doubtless have been
Mack's safest course; for he was strong enough to brush aside Soult,
gain Tyrol, seal up its valleys against Napoleon, and carry
reinforcements to the Archduke Charles. But he was still
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