se_, will reach
Toulon the 20th _pluviose:_ the united squadrons will set sail in
_ventose_, and arrive in _germinal_ before Boulogne--that is rather
late. In any case the Egyptian Expedition will cover the departure of
the Toulon squadron: everything will be managed _so that Nelson will
first sail for Alexandria_."
These schemes reveal the strong and also the weak qualities of
Napoleon. He perceived the strength of the central position which
France enjoyed on her four coasts; and he now contrived all his
dispositions, both naval and political, so as to tempt Nelson away
eastwards from Toulon during the concentration of the French fleet in
the Channel; and for this purpose he informed the military officers at
Toulon that their destination was Taranto and the Morea. It was to
these points that he wished to decoy Nelson; for this end had he sent
his troops to Taranto, and kept up French intrigues in Corfu, the
Morea, and Egypt; it was for this purpose that he charged that wily
spy Mehee to inform Drake that the Toulon fleet was to take 40,000
French troops to the Morea, and that the Brest fleet, with 200 highly
trained Irish officers, was intended solely for Ireland. But, while
displaying consummate guile, he failed to allow for the uncertainties
of operations conducted by sea. Ignoring the patent fact that the
Toulon fleet was blockaded by Nelson, and that of Rochefort by
Collingwood, he fixed the dates of their departure and junction as
though he were ordering the movements of a _corps d'armee_ in
Provence; and this craving for certainty was to mar his naval plans
and dog his footsteps with the shadow of disaster.[324]
The plan of using the Toulon fleet to cover an invasion of England was
not entirely new. As far back as the days of De Tourville, a somewhat
similar plan had been devised: the French Channel and Atlantic fleets
under that admiral were closely to engage Russell off the Isle of
Wight, while the Toulon squadron, sailing northwards, was to collect
the French transports on the coasts of Normandy for the invasion of
England. Had Napoleon carefully studied French naval history, he would
have seen that the disaster of La Hogue was largely caused by the
severe weather which prevented the rendezvous, and brought about a
hasty and ill-advised alteration in the original scheme. But of all
subjects on which he spoke as an authority, there was perhaps not one
that he had so inadequately studied as naval strategy: y
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