et their natural reward in 1809. The war of 1812
marshalled both Austria and Prussia as vassal States in Napoleon's
crusade against Russia. But it also brought salvation, and Napoleon's
fateful obstinacy during the negotiations at Prague virtually
compelled his own father-in-law to draw the sword against him.
Ostensibly, the points at issue were finally narrowed down to the
control of the Confederation of the Rhine, the ownership of North
Germany, and a few smaller points. But really there was a deeper
cause, the character of Napoleon.

The vindictiveness with which he had trampled on his foes, his almost
superhuman lust of domination, and the halting way in which he met all
overtures for a compromise--this it was that drove the Hapsburgs into
an alliance with their traditional foes. His conduct may be explained
on diverse grounds, as springing from the vendetta instincts of his
race, or from his still viewing events through the distorting medium
of the Continental System, or from his ingrained conviction that, at
bottom, rulers are influenced only by intimidation.

In any case, he had now succeeded in bringing about the very thing
which Charles James Fox had declared to be impossible. In opening the
negotiations for peace with France in April, 1806, our Foreign
Minister had declared to Talleyrand that "the project of combining the
whole of Europe against France is to the last degree chimerical." Yet
Great Britain and the Spanish patriots, after struggling alone against
the conqueror from 1808 to 1812, saw Russia, Sweden, Prussia, and
Austria, successively range themselves on their side. It is true, the
Germans of the Rhenish Confederation, the Italians, Swiss, and Danes
were still enrolled under the banners of the new Charlemagne; but,
with the exception of the last, they fought wearily or questioningly,
as for a cause that promised naught but barren triumphs and unending
strife.

Truly, the years that witnessed Napoleon's fall were fruitful in
paradox. The greatest political genius of the age, for lack of the
saving grace of moderation, had banded Europe against him: and the
most calculating of commanders had also given his enemies time to
frame an effective military combination. The Prussian General von
Boyen has told us in his Memoirs how dismayed ardent patriots were at
the conclusion of the armistice in June, and how slow even the wiser
heads were to see that it would benefit their cause. If Napoleon
needed it