d to the present demand of the allies. He very
properly refused to do this; and, despite his eagerness to come to an
arrangement and end the misfortunes of France, referred the matter to
his master.[409]

What were Napoleon's views on these questions? It is difficult to
follow the workings of his mind before the time when Caulaincourt's
despatch flashed the horrible truth upon him that he might, after all,
leave France smaller and weaker than he found her. Then the lightnings
of his wrath flash forth, and we see the tumult and anguish of that
mighty soul: but previously the storm-wrack of passion and the
cloud-bank of his clinging will are lit up by few gleams of the
earlier piercing intelligence. On January the 4th he had written to
Caulaincourt that the policy of England and the personal rancour of
the Czar would drag Austria along. If Fortune betrayed him (Napoleon)
he would give up the throne: never would he sign any shameful peace.
But he added: "You must see what Metternich wants: it is not to
Austria's interest to push matters to the end." In the accompanying
instructions to his plenipotentiary, he seems to assent to the Alpine
and Rhenish frontiers, but advises him to sign the preliminaries as
vaguely as possible, "_as we have everything to gain by delay_." The
Rhine frontier must be so described as to leave France the Dutch
fortresses: and Savona and Spezzia must also count as on the French
side of the Alps. These, be it observed, are his notions when he has
not heard of the defection of Murat, or the rejection of his Spanish
bargain by the Cortes.

Twelve days later he proposes to Metternich an armistice, and again
suggests that it is not to Austria's interest to press matters too
far. But the allies are too wary to leave such a matter to Metternich:
at Teplitz they bound themselves to common action; and the proposal
only shows them the need of pushing on fast while their foe is still
unprepared. Once more his old optimism asserts itself. The first
French success, that at Brienne, leads him to hope that the allies
will now be ready to make peace. Even after the disaster at La
Rothiere, he believes that the mere arrival of Caulaincourt at the
allied headquarters will foment the discords which there exist.[410]
Then, writing amidst the unspeakable miseries at Troyes (February
4th), he upbraids Caulaincourt for worrying him about "powers and
instructions when it is still doubtful if the enemy wants to
negotiat