ll is not cast that will kill me."

Yes: Napoleon displayed during these last ten days a fertility of
resource, a power to drive back the tide of events, that have dazzled
posterity, as they dismayed his foes. We may seek in vain for a
parallel, save perhaps in the careers of Hannibal and Frederick.
Alexander the Great's victories were won over Asiatics: Caesar's
magnificent rally of his wavering bands against the onrush of the
Nervii was but one effort of disciplined valour crushing the
impetuosity of the barbarian. Marlborough and Wellington often
triumphed over great odds and turned the course of history. But their
star had never set so low as that of Napoleon's after La Rothiere, and
never did it rush to the zenith with a splendour like that which
blinded the trained hosts of Bluecher and Schwarzenberg. Whatever the
mistakes of these leaders, and they were great, there is something
that defies analysis in Napoleon's sudden transformation of his beaten
dispirited band into a triumphant array before which four times their
numbers sought refuge in retreat. But it is just this transcendent
quality that adds a charm to the character and career of Napoleon.
Where analysis fails, there genius begins.

* * * * *

CHAPTER XXXVII

THE FIRST ABDICATION

It now remained to be seen whether Napoleon would make a wise use of
his successes. While the Grand Army drew in its columns behind the
sheltering line of the Seine at Troyes, the French Emperor strove to
reap in diplomacy the fruits of his military prowess. In brief, he
sought to detach Austria from the Coalition. From Nogent he wrote, on
February 21st, to the Emperor Francis, dwelling on the impolicy of
Austria continuing the war. Why should she subordinate her policy to
that of England and to the personal animosities of the Czar? Why
should she see her former Belgian provinces handed over to a
Protestant Dutch Prince about to be allied with the House of Brunswick
by marriage? France would never give up Belgium; and he, as French
Emperor, would never sign a peace that would drive her from the Rhine
and exclude her from the circle of the Great Powers. But if Austria
really wished for the equilibrium of Europe, he (Napoleon) was ready
to forget the past and make peace on the basis of the Frankfurt
terms.[415]

Had these offers been rather less exacting, and reached the allied
headquarters a week earlier, they might have led to the