cant words, that show the
Emperor's belief in the ineradicable strength of instinct and early
training.[479]
Despite these two mishaps, the French on the morning of the 15th
succeeded in driving Ziethen's men from the banks of the Sambre about
Thuin, while Napoleon in person broke through their line at Charleroi.
After suffering rather severely, the defenders fell back on Gilly,
whither Napoleon and his main force followed them; while the left wing
of the French advance, now intrusted to Ney, was swung forward against
the all-important position of Quatre Bras.
We here approach one of the knotty questions of the campaign. Why did
not Ney occupy the cross-roads in force on the evening of the 15th? We
may note first that not till the 11th had Napoleon thought fit to
summon Ney to the army, so that the Marshal did not come up till the
afternoon of this very day. He at once had an interview with the
Emperor, who, according to General Gourgaud, gave the Marshal verbal
orders to take command of the corps of Reille and D'Erlon, to push on
northwards, take up a position at Quatre Bras, and throw out advanced
posts beyond on the Brussels and Namur roads; but it seems unlikely
that the Emperor would have given one of the most venturesome of his
Marshals an absolute order to push on so far in advance, unless the
French right wing had driven the Prussians back beyond the Sombref
position. Otherwise, Ney would have been dangerously far in advance of
the main body and exposed to blows either from the Prussians or the
British.
However this may be, Ney certainly felt insecure, and did not push on
with his wonted dash; while, fortunately for the allies, an officer
was at hand Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, who saw the need of holding
Quatre Bras at all costs.[480] The young leader imposed on the foe by
making the most of his men--they were but 4,500 all told, and had only
ten bullets apiece--and he succeeded. For once, Ney was prudent to a
fault, and did not push home the attack. In his excuse it may be said
that the men of Reille's corps, on whom he had to rely--for D'Erlon's
corps was still far to the rear--had been marching and fighting ever
since dawn, and were too weary for another battle. Moreover, the roar
of cannon on the south-east warned him that the right wing of the
French advance was hotly engaged between Gilly and Fleurus; until it
beat back the Prussians, his own position was dangerously "in the
air"; and, as but tw
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