He also thought
lightly of Wellington and Bluecher. The former he had pronounced
"incapable and unwise"; as for Bluecher, he told Campbell at Elba that
he was "no general"; but that he admired the pluck with which "the old
devil" came on again after a thrashing.

Unclouded confidence is seen in every phrase of the letters that he
penned at Charleroi early on the 16th. He informs Ney that he intends
soon to attack the Prussians at Sombref, _if he finds them there_, to
clear the road as far as Gembloux, and then to decide on his further
actions as the case demands. Meanwhile Ney is to sweep the road in
front of Quatre Bras, placing his first division two leagues beyond
that position, if it seemed desirable, with a view to marching on
Brussels during the night with his whole force of about 50,000 men.
The Guard is to be kept in reserve as much as possible, so as to
support either Napoleon on the Gembloux road, or Ney on the Brussels
road; and "if any skirmish takes place with the English, it is
preferable that the work should fall on the Line rather than on the
Guard." As for the Prussian resistance, Napoleon rated it almost as
lightly as that of the English; for he regards it as probable that he
will in the evening _march on Brussels with his Guard_.

While he pictured his enemies hopelessly scattered or in retreat, they
were beginning to muster at the very points which he believed to be
within his grasp. At 11 a.m. only Ziethen's corps, now but 28,000
strong, was in position at Sombref, but the corps of Pirch I. and
Thielmann came up shortly after midday. Had Napoleon pushed on early
on the 16th, he must easily have gained the Ligny-Sombref position.
What, then, caused the delay in the French attack? It can be traced to
the slowness of Gerard's advance, to the Emperor's misconception of
the situation, and to his despatch to Grouchy.

[Illustration: BATTLE OF LIGNY.]

In this he reckoned the Prussians at
40,000 men, and ordered Grouchy to repair with the French right wing
to Sombref.

" ... I shall be at Fleurus between 10 and 11 a.m.: I shall
proceed to Sombref, leaving my Guard, both infantry and cavalry,
at Fleurus: I would not take it to Sombref, unless it should be
necessary. If the enemy is at Sombref, I mean to attack him: I
mean to attack him even at Gembloux, and to gain this position
also, my aim being, after having known about these two positions,
to set out to-night, and to o