The infantry
now began to file off by degrees behind hedges or under cover of a
screen of cavalry and skirmishers, these keeping Ney's men busy in
front, until the bulk of the army was well through the narrow and
crowded street of Genappe.

And how came it that Napoleon and Ney missed this golden opportunity?
In the first case, it was due to their chiefs of staff, who had not
sent overnight any tidings as to the results of their respective
battles. Until Count Flahaut returned to the Imperial headquarters
about 8 a.m., Napoleon knew nothing as to the position of affairs at
Quatre Bras; while a similar carelessness on Soult's part left Ney
powerless to attempt anything against Wellington until somewhat later
in the morning.

But Napoleon's inaction lasted nearly up to 11.30. How is this to be
accounted for? In reply, some attribute his conduct to illness of body
and torpor of mind--a topic that will engage our attention presently;
others assert that the army urgently needed rest; but the effective
cause was his belief that the Prussians were retreating eastwards away
from Wellington. This was the universal belief at headquarters. He had
ordered Grouchy to follow them at dawn; Grouchy's lieutenant, Pajol,
struck to the south-east, and by 4 a.m. reported that Bluecher was
heading for Namur. Such was the news that the Emperor heard from
Grouchy about 8 a.m.--he refused to grant him an audience earlier.
Forthwith he dictated a letter to Ney to the following effect: that
the Prussians had been routed and were being pursued towards Namur;
that the British could not attack him (Ney) at Quatre Bras, for the
Emperor would in that case march on their flank and destroy them in an
instant; that he heard with pain how isolated Ney's troops had been on
the 16th, and ordered him to close up his divisions and occupy Quatre
Bras. If he could not effect that task, he must warn the Emperor, who
would then come. Finally, he warned him that "the present day is
needed to finish this operation, to complete the munitions of war, to
rally stragglers and call in detachments."

A singular day's programme this for the man who had trebled the
results of the victory of Jena by the remorseless energy of the
pursuit. After dictating this despatch, he ordered Lobau to take a
division of infantry for the support of Pajol on the Namur road. He
then set out for St. Amand in his carriage. On arriving at the place
of carnage he mounted his horse and rod