top the
Prussians joining Wellington, if they were in force.[503]

Moreover, Napoleon now knew, what Grouchy did not know, that the
Prussians were in force at Wavre. It seems strange that the Emperor
did not send this important news to his Marshal; but perhaps we may
explain this by his absence at the outposts. As it was, no clear
statement of the facts of the case was sent off to Grouchy _until 10
a.m. of the 18th_. He then informed his Marshal that, according to all
the reports, three bodies of Prussians had made for Wavre. Grouchy
"must therefore move thither--in order to approach us, to put yourself
within the sphere of our operations, and to keep up your
communications with us, pushing before you those bodies of Prussians
which have taken this direction and which may have stopped at Wavre,
where you ought to arrive as soon as possible." Grouchy, however, was
not to neglect Bluecher's troops that were on his right, but must pick
up their stragglers and keep up his communications with Napoleon.

Such was the letter; and again we must pronounce it far from clear.
Grouchy was not bidden to throw all his efforts on the side of Wavre;
and he was not told whether he must attack the enemy at that town, or
interpose a wedge between them and Wellington, or support Napoleon's
right. Now Napoleon would certainly have prescribed an immediate
concentration of Grouchy's force towards the north-west for one of the
last two objects, had he believed Bluecher about to attempt a flank
march against the chief French army. Obviously it had not yet entered
his thoughts that so daring a step would be taken by a foe whom he
pictured as scattered and demoralized by defeat.[504]

As we have seen, the Prussians were not demoralized; they had not gone
off in three directions; and Bluecher was not making for Liege. He was
at Wavre and was planning a master-stroke. At midnight, he had sent to
Wellington, through Mueffling, a written promise that at dawn he would
set the corps of Buelow in motion against Napoleon's right; that of
Pirch I. was to follow; while the other two corps would also be ready
to set out. Wellington received this despatch about 3 a.m. of the
18th, and thereupon definitely resolved to offer battle. A similar
message was sent off from Wavre at 9.30 a.m., but with a postscript,
in which we may discern Gneisenau's distrust of Wellington, begging
Mueffling to find out accurately whether the Duke really had determined
to fight