ttin and Kuestrin. Thus Napoleon
proposed to act on the offensive in the open country towards Berlin
and in Silesia, remaining at first on the defensive at Dresden and in
the Lusatian mountains. This was against the advice of Marmont, who
urged him to strike first at Prague, and not to intrust his
lieutenants with great undertakings far away from Dresden. The advice
proved to be sound; but it seems certain that Napoleon intended to
open the campaign by a mighty blow dealt at Bluecher, and then to lead
a great force through the Lusatian defiles into Bohemia and drive the
allies before him towards Vienna.
But what did he presume that the allied forces in Bohemia would be
doing while he overwhelmed Bluecher in Silesia? Would not Dresden and
his communications with France be left open to their blows? He decided
to run this risk. He had 100,000 men among the Lusatian hills between
Bautzen and Zittau. St. Cyr's corps was strongly posted at Pirna and
the small fortress of Koenigstein, while his light troops watched the
passes north of Teplitz and Karlsbad. If the allies sought to invade
Saxony, they would, so Napoleon thought, try to force the Zittau road,
which presented few natural difficulties. If they threatened Dresden
by the passages further west, Vandamme would march from near Zittau to
reinforce St. Cyr, or, if need be, the Emperor himself would hurry
back from Silesia with his Guards. If the enemy invaded Bavaria,
Napoleon wished them _bon voyage_: they would soon come back faster
than they went; for, in that case, he would pour his columns down from
Zittau towards Prague and Vienna. The thought that he might for a time
be cut off from France troubled him not: "400,000 men," he said,
"resting on a system of strongholds, on a river like the Elbe, are not
to be turned." In truth, he thought little about the Bohemian army. If
40,000 Russians had entered Bohemia, they would not reach Prague till
the 25th; so he wrote to St. Cyr On the 17th, the day when hostilities
could first begin; and he evidently believed that Dresden would be
safe till September. Its defence seemed assured by the skill of that
master of defensive warfare, St. Cyr, by the barrier of the Erz
Mountains, and still more by Austrian slowness.
Of this characteristic of theirs he cherished great hopes. Their
finances were in dire disorder; and Fouche, who had just returned from
a tour in the Hapsburg States, reported that the best way of striking
at that
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