hat the French had
thrown up south of Dresden, and cutting their communications with
France. He himself would march north-west, join the northern army, and
thereafter meet them at Leipzig. This rendezvous he kept, as later he
staunchly kept troth with Wellington at Waterloo; and we may detect
here, as in 1815, the strategic genius of Gneisenau as the prime
motive force.

Leaving a small force to screen his former positions at Bautzen, the
veteran, with 65,000 men, stealthily set out on his flank march
towards Wittenberg, threw two pontoon bridges over the Elbe at
Wartenburg, about ten miles above that fortress, drove away Bertrand's
battalions who hindered the crossing, and threw up earthworks to
protect the bridges (October 3rd). This done, he began to feel about
for Bernadotte, and came into touch with him south of Dessau. By this
daring march he placed two armies, amounting to 160,000 men, on the
north of Napoleon's lines; and his personal influence checked, even if
it did not wholly stop, the diplomatic loiterings of the Swedish Crown
Prince.[368] Bernadotte's hesitations were finally overcome by the
news that Bluecher was marching south towards Leipzig. Finally he gave
orders to follow him; but we may judge how easy would have been the
task of overthrowing Bernadotte's discordant array if Napoleon could
have carried out his project of September 30th.

As it was, the disaster of Kulm kept the Emperor tethered for some
days within a few leagues of Dresden, while Buelow and Bluecher saved
the campaign for the allies in the north, thereby exciting a patriotic
ferment which drove Jerome Bonaparte from Cassel and kept Davoust to
the defensive around Hamburg. There the skilful moves of Walmoden with
a force of Russians, British, Swedes, and North Germans kept in check
the ablest of the French Marshals, and prevented his junction with the
Emperor, for which the latter never ceased to struggle.

Meanwhile the Grand Army of the allies, strengthened by the approach
from Poland of 50,000 Russians of the Army of Reserve, was creeping
through the western passes of the Erz into the plains south of
Leipzig. This move was not unexpected by Napoleon. The importance of
that city was obvious. Situated in the midst of the fertile Saxon
plain, the centre of a great system ofroads, its position and its
wealth alike marked it out as the place likely to be seized by a
daring foe who should seek to cut Napoleon off from France.

As for