onized,
or is there one harmony within another? But the soul does not admit of
degrees, and cannot therefore be more or less harmonized. Further, the
soul is often engaged in resisting the affections of the body, as Homer
describes Odysseus 'rebuking his heart.' Could he have written this
under the idea that the soul is a harmony of the body? Nay rather, are
we not contradicting Homer and ourselves in affirming anything of the
sort?
The goddess Harmonia, as Socrates playfully terms the argument of
Simmias, has been happily disposed of; and now an answer has to be given
to the Theban Cadmus. Socrates recapitulates the argument of Cebes,
which, as he remarks, involves the whole question of natural growth or
causation; about this he proposes to narrate his own mental experience.
When he was young he had puzzled himself with physics: he had enquired
into the growth and decay of animals, and the origin of thought, until
at last he began to doubt the self-evident fact that growth is the
result of eating and drinking; and so he arrived at the conclusion that
he was not meant for such enquiries. Nor was he less perplexed with
notions of comparison and number. At first he had imagined himself to
understand differences of greater and less, and to know that ten is two
more than eight, and the like. But now those very notions appeared to
him to contain a contradiction. For how can one be divided into two? Or
two be compounded into one? These are difficulties which Socrates cannot
answer. Of generation and destruction he knows nothing. But he has a
confused notion of another method in which matters of this sort are to
be investigated. (Compare Republic; Charm.)
Then he heard some one reading out of a book of Anaxagoras, that mind is
the cause of all things. And he said to himself: If mind is the cause
of all things, surely mind must dispose them all for the best. The new
teacher will show me this 'order of the best' in man and nature. How
great had been his hopes and how great his disappointment! For he found
that his new friend was anything but consistent in his use of mind as
a cause, and that he soon introduced winds, waters, and other eccentric
notions. (Compare Arist. Metaph.) It was as if a person had said that
Socrates is sitting here because he is made up of bones and muscles,
instead of telling the true reason--that he is here because the
Athenians have thought good to sentence him to death, and he has thought
good to a
|