should imagine so, said Cebes.
And the uncompounded may be assumed to be the same and unchanging,
whereas the compound is always changing and never the same.
I agree, he said.
Then now let us return to the previous discussion. Is that idea or
essence, which in the dialectical process we define as essence or true
existence--whether essence of equality, beauty, or anything else--are
these essences, I say, liable at times to some degree of change? or
are they each of them always what they are, having the same simple
self-existent and unchanging forms, not admitting of variation at all,
or in any way, or at any time?
They must be always the same, Socrates, replied Cebes.
And what would you say of the many beautiful--whether men or horses or
garments or any other things which are named by the same names and may
be called equal or beautiful,--are they all unchanging and the same
always, or quite the reverse? May they not rather be described as almost
always changing and hardly ever the same, either with themselves or with
one another?
The latter, replied Cebes; they are always in a state of change.
And these you can touch and see and perceive with the senses, but
the unchanging things you can only perceive with the mind--they are
invisible and are not seen?
That is very true, he said.
Well, then, added Socrates, let us suppose that there are two sorts of
existences--one seen, the other unseen.
Let us suppose them.
The seen is the changing, and the unseen is the unchanging?
That may be also supposed.
And, further, is not one part of us body, another part soul?
To be sure.
And to which class is the body more alike and akin?
Clearly to the seen--no one can doubt that.
And is the soul seen or not seen?
Not by man, Socrates.
And what we mean by 'seen' and 'not seen' is that which is or is not
visible to the eye of man?
Yes, to the eye of man.
And is the soul seen or not seen?
Not seen.
Unseen then?
Yes.
Then the soul is more like to the unseen, and the body to the seen?
That follows necessarily, Socrates.
And were we not saying long ago that the soul when using the body as an
instrument of perception, that is to say, when using the sense of sight
or hearing or some other sense (for the meaning of perceiving through
the body is perceiving through the senses)--were we not saying that the
soul too is then dragged by the body into the region of the changeable,
and wande
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