only
looking at the image reflected in the water, or in some similar medium.
So in my own case, I was afraid that my soul might be blinded altogether
if I looked at things with my eyes or tried to apprehend them by the
help of the senses. And I thought that I had better have recourse to the
world of mind and seek there the truth of existence. I dare say that
the simile is not perfect--for I am very far from admitting that he who
contemplates existences through the medium of thought, sees them only
'through a glass darkly,' any more than he who considers them in action
and operation. However, this was the method which I adopted: I first
assumed some principle which I judged to be the strongest, and then I
affirmed as true whatever seemed to agree with this, whether relating
to the cause or to anything else; and that which disagreed I regarded
as untrue. But I should like to explain my meaning more clearly, as I do
not think that you as yet understand me.

No indeed, replied Cebes, not very well.

There is nothing new, he said, in what I am about to tell you; but
only what I have been always and everywhere repeating in the previous
discussion and on other occasions: I want to show you the nature of that
cause which has occupied my thoughts. I shall have to go back to those
familiar words which are in the mouth of every one, and first of all
assume that there is an absolute beauty and goodness and greatness, and
the like; grant me this, and I hope to be able to show you the nature of
the cause, and to prove the immortality of the soul.

Cebes said: You may proceed at once with the proof, for I grant you
this.

Well, he said, then I should like to know whether you agree with me
in the next step; for I cannot help thinking, if there be anything
beautiful other than absolute beauty should there be such, that it can
be beautiful only in as far as it partakes of absolute beauty--and I
should say the same of everything. Do you agree in this notion of the
cause?

Yes, he said, I agree.

He proceeded: I know nothing and can understand nothing of any other of
those wise causes which are alleged; and if a person says to me that
the bloom of colour, or form, or any such thing is a source of beauty,
I leave all that, which is only confusing to me, and simply and singly,
and perhaps foolishly, hold and am assured in my own mind that nothing
makes a thing beautiful but the presence and participation of beauty in
whatever way or