.

But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone, or other
material equals? and what is the impression produced by them? Are they
equals in the same sense in which absolute equality is equal? or do they
fall short of this perfect equality in a measure?

Yes, he said, in a very great measure too.

And must we not allow, that when I or any one, looking at any object,
observes that the thing which he sees aims at being some other thing,
but falls short of, and cannot be, that other thing, but is inferior, he
who makes this observation must have had a previous knowledge of that to
which the other, although similar, was inferior?

Certainly.

And has not this been our own case in the matter of equals and of
absolute equality?

Precisely.

Then we must have known equality previously to the time when we first
saw the material equals, and reflected that all these apparent equals
strive to attain absolute equality, but fall short of it?

Very true.

And we recognize also that this absolute equality has only been known,
and can only be known, through the medium of sight or touch, or of some
other of the senses, which are all alike in this respect?

Yes, Socrates, as far as the argument is concerned, one of them is the
same as the other.

From the senses then is derived the knowledge that all sensible things
aim at an absolute equality of which they fall short?

Yes.

Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way, we must have
had a knowledge of absolute equality, or we could not have referred to
that standard the equals which are derived from the senses?--for to that
they all aspire, and of that they fall short.

No other inference can be drawn from the previous statements.

And did we not see and hear and have the use of our other senses as soon
as we were born?

Certainly.

Then we must have acquired the knowledge of equality at some previous
time?

Yes.

That is to say, before we were born, I suppose?

True.

And if we acquired this knowledge before we were born, and were born
having the use of it, then we also knew before we were born and at the
instant of birth not only the equal or the greater or the less, but all
other ideas; for we are not speaking only of equality, but of beauty,
goodness, justice, holiness, and of all which we stamp with the name of
essence in the dialectical process, both when we ask and when we answer
questions. Of all this we may certainly affir