his possessions, with the willingness to die which we
were just now attributing to the philosopher? That the wisest of men
should be willing to leave a service in which they are ruled by the gods
who are the best of rulers, is not reasonable; for surely no wise man
thinks that when set at liberty he can take better care of himself than
the gods take of him. A fool may perhaps think so--he may argue that he
had better run away from his master, not considering that his duty is
to remain to the end, and not to run away from the good, and that there
would be no sense in his running away. The wise man will want to be ever
with him who is better than himself. Now this, Socrates, is the reverse
of what was just now said; for upon this view the wise man should sorrow
and the fool rejoice at passing out of life.

The earnestness of Cebes seemed to please Socrates. Here, said he,
turning to us, is a man who is always inquiring, and is not so easily
convinced by the first thing which he hears.

And certainly, added Simmias, the objection which he is now making does
appear to me to have some force. For what can be the meaning of a truly
wise man wanting to fly away and lightly leave a master who is better
than himself? And I rather imagine that Cebes is referring to you; he
thinks that you are too ready to leave us, and too ready to leave the
gods whom you acknowledge to be our good masters.

Yes, replied Socrates; there is reason in what you say. And so you think
that I ought to answer your indictment as if I were in a court?

We should like you to do so, said Simmias.

Then I must try to make a more successful defence before you than I
did when before the judges. For I am quite ready to admit, Simmias and
Cebes, that I ought to be grieved at death, if I were not persuaded in
the first place that I am going to other gods who are wise and good (of
which I am as certain as I can be of any such matters), and secondly
(though I am not so sure of this last) to men departed, better than
those whom I leave behind; and therefore I do not grieve as I might have
done, for I have good hope that there is yet something remaining for the
dead, and as has been said of old, some far better thing for the good
than for the evil.

But do you mean to take away your thoughts with you, Socrates? said
Simmias. Will you not impart them to us?--for they are a benefit
in which we too are entitled to share. Moreover, if you succeed in
convincing us,