are not 'in pari materia' with arguments from
the visible to the invisible, and are therefore felt to be no longer
applicable. The evidence to the historical fact seems to be weaker than
was once supposed: it is not consistent with itself, and is based upon
documents which are of unknown origin. The immortality of man must be
proved by other arguments than these if it is again to become a living
belief. We must ask ourselves afresh why we still maintain it, and seek
to discover a foundation for it in the nature of God and in the first
principles of morality.
3. At the outset of the discussion we may clear away a confusion. We
certainly do not mean by the immortality of the soul the immortality of
fame, which whether worth having or not can only be ascribed to a very
select class of the whole race of mankind, and even the interest in
these few is comparatively short-lived. To have been a benefactor to the
world, whether in a higher or a lower sphere of life and thought, is a
great thing: to have the reputation of being one, when men have passed
out of the sphere of earthly praise or blame, is hardly worthy of
consideration. The memory of a great man, so far from being immortal,
is really limited to his own generation:--so long as his friends or his
disciples are alive, so long as his books continue to be read, so long
as his political or military successes fill a page in the history of
his country. The praises which are bestowed upon him at his death hardly
last longer than the flowers which are strewed upon his coffin or the
'immortelles' which are laid upon his tomb. Literature makes the most
of its heroes, but the true man is well aware that far from enjoying an
immortality of fame, in a generation or two, or even in a much shorter
time, he will be forgotten and the world will get on without him.
4. Modern philosophy is perplexed at this whole question, which is
sometimes fairly given up and handed over to the realm of faith. The
perplexity should not be forgotten by us when we attempt to submit the
Phaedo of Plato to the requirements of logic. For what idea can we form
of the soul when separated from the body? Or how can the soul be united
with the body and still be independent? Is the soul related to the
body as the ideal to the real, or as the whole to the parts, or as the
subject to the object, or as the cause to the effect, or as the end to
the means? Shall we say with Aristotle, that the soul is the entelechy
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