e are so many doubtful and contested rights that most wars,
though apparently based upon bequests, or wills, or marriages, are in
reality but wars of expediency. The question of the succession to the
Spanish crown under Louis XIV. was very clear, since it was plainly
settled by a solemn will, and was supported by family ties and by the
general consent of the Spanish nation; yet it was stoutly contested by
all Europe, and produced a general coalition against the legitimate
legatee.

Frederick II., while Austria and France were at war, brought forward an
old claim, entered Silesia in force and seized this province, thus
doubling the power of Prussia. This was a stroke of genius; and, even if
he had failed, he could not have been much censured; for the grandeur
and importance of the enterprise justified him in his attempt, as far as
such attempts can be justified.

In wars of this nature no rules can be laid down. To watch and to profit
by every circumstance covers all that can be said. Offensive movements
should be suitable to the end to be attained. The most natural step
would be to occupy the disputed territory: then offensive operations may
be carried on according to circumstances and to the respective strength
of the parties, the object being to secure the cession of the territory
by the enemy, and the means being to threaten him in the heart of his
own country. Every thing depends upon the alliances the parties may be
able to secure with other states, and upon their military resources. In
an offensive movement, scrupulous care must be exercised not to arouse
the jealousy of any other state which might come to the aid of the
enemy. It is a part of the duty of a statesman to foresee this chance,
and to obviate it by making proper explanations and giving proper
guarantees to other states.

ARTICLE II.

Of Wars Defensive Politically, and Offensive in a Military Point of
View.

A state attacked by another which renews an old claim rarely yields it
without a war: it prefers to defend its territory, as is always more
honorable. But it may be advantageous to take the offensive, instead of
awaiting the attack on the frontiers.

There are often advantages in a war of invasion: there are also
advantages in awaiting the enemy upon one's own soil. A power with no
internal dissensions, and under no apprehension of an attack by a third
party, will always find it advantageous to carry the war upon hostile
soil. This