Wisconsin R.R. Com.,
237 U.S. 220, 226 (1915); St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. _v._ Public
Service Com., 254 U.S. 535, 536-537 (1921).

[802] St. Louis & San Francisco R. Co. _v._ Public Service Com., 261
U.S. 369, 371 (1923).

[803] Wisconsin, Minnesota & Pacific R.R. _v._ Jacobson, 179 U.S. 287
(1900).

[804] Missouri P.R. Co. _v._ Larabee Flour Mills Co., 211 U.S. 612
(1909).

[805] McNeill _v._ Southern R. Co., 202 U.S. 543 (1906).

[806] St. Louis S.W.R. Co. _v._ Arkansas, 217 U.S. 136 (1910).

[807] _See e.g._ The Court's language in Hannibal & St. L.R. Co. _v._
Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 470 (1878); New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. _v._ New York,
165 U.S. 628, 631 (1897); Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co. _v._ Ohio ex rel.
Lawrence, 173 U.S. 285, 292 (1899); Hennington _v._ Georgia, 163 U.S.
299 (1896); Simpson _v._ Shepard (Minnesota Rate Cases), 230 U.S. 352,
402-410 (1913).

[808] Smith _v._ Alabama, 124 U.S. 465 (1888); _see also_ Nashville, C.
& St. L.R. Co. _v._ Alabama, 128 U.S. 96 (1888); McCall _v._ California,
136 U.S. 104 (1890); Missouri, K. & T.R. Co. _v._ Haber, 109 U.S. 613,
633 (1898).

[809] New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. _v._ New York, 165 U.S. 628 (1807). _See
also_ Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co. _v._ Solan, 169 U.S. 133, 137 (1898).

[810] Erb _v._ Morasch, 177 U.S. 584 (1900).

[811] Erie R.R. Co. _v._ Public Utility Commrs., 254 U.S. 394 (1921).

[812] Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. _v._ R.R. Comm., 283 U.S. 380 (1931).

[813] Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. _v._ Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453 (1911).

[814] Ibid, 453, 466. _See also_ St. Louis, I.M. & S. Co. _v._ Arkansas,
240 U.S. 518 (1916); Missouri P.R. Co. _v._ Norwood, 283 U.S. 249
(1931).

[815] Terminal Railroad Assn. _v._ Brotherhood, 318 U.S. 1 (1943).

[816] 163 U.S. 299 (1896). In South Covington R. Co. _v._ Covington, 235
U.S. 537 (1915), the Court sustained a municipal ordinance which
prohibits the company from allowing passengers to ride on the rear or
front platforms without suitable barriers, and requires that the cars be
kept clean and ventilated and fumigated. However, provisions of the
ordinance that cars shall never be permitted to fall below a certain
temperature and regulating the number of passengers to be carried in the
cars were held to be unreasonable and violative of the commerce clause.
There was no unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce by a
municipal ordinance which directed a railway company to remove its
tracks from a busy