tober 11, 1785.

Dear Sir,

I received, last night, the letter signed by yourself and the other
gentlemen, delegates of Massachusetts and Virginia, recommending Mr.
Sayre for the Barbary negotiations. As that was the first moment of its
suggestion to me, you will perceive by my letter of this day, to Mr Jay,
that the business was already established in other hands, as your letter
came at the same time with the papers actually signed by Mr. Adams, for
Messrs. Barclay and Lambe, according to arrangements previously taken
between us. I should, with great satisfaction, have acceded to the
recommendation in the letter: not indeed as to Morocco, because, no
better man than Mr. Barclay could have been substituted; but as to
Algiers, Mr. Lambe being less known to me. However, I hope well of him,
and rely considerably on the aid he will receive from his secretary, Mr.
Randall, who bears a very good character. I suppose Mr. Adams entitled
to the same just apology, as matters were settled otherwise, before he
probably received your letter. I pray you to communicate this to the
other gentlemen of your and our delegation as my justification.

The peace made between the Emperor and Dutch, leaves Europe quiet for
this campaign. As yet, we do not know where the storm, dissipated for
the moment, will gather again. Probably over Bavaria or Turkey. But this
will be for another year.

When our instructions were made out, they were conceived on a general
scale, and supposed that all the European nations would be disposed to
form commercial connections with us. It is evident, however, that a very
different degree of importance was annexed to these different states.
Spain, Portugal, England, and France, were most important. Holland,
Sweden, Denmark, in a middling degree. The others, still less so. Spain
treats in another line. Portugal is disposed to do the same. England
will not treat at all; nor will France, probably, add to her former
treaty. Failing in the execution of these our capital objects, it has
appeared to me, that the pushing the treaties with the lesser powers,
might do us more harm than good, by hampering the measures the States
may find it necessary to take, for securing those commercial interests,
by separate measures, which is refused to be done here, in concert. I
have understood through various channels, that the members of Congress
wished a change in our instructions. I have, in my letter to Mr. Jay, of
this date, men