But
while the people choose to maintain it as it is, while they are
satisfied with it, and refuse to change it, who has given, or who can
give, to the State legislatures a right to alter it, either by
interference, construction, or otherwise? Gentlemen do not seem to
recollect that the people have any power to do any thing for themselves.
They imagine there is no safety for them, any longer than they are under
the close guardianship of the State legislatures. Sir, the people have
not trusted their safety, in regard to the general Constitution, to
these hands. They have required other security, and taken other bonds.
They have chosen to trust themselves, first, to the plain words of the
instrument, and to such construction as the government themselves, in
doubtful cases, should put on their own powers, under their oaths of
office, and subject to their responsibility to them; just as the people
of a State trust their own State governments with a similar power.
Secondly, they have reposed their trust in the efficacy of frequent
elections, and in their own power to remove their own servants and
agents whenever they see cause. Thirdly, they have reposed trust in the
judicial power, which, in order that it might be trustworthy, they have
made as respectable, as disinterested, and as independent as was
practicable. Fourthly, they have seen fit to rely, in case of necessity,
or high expediency, on their known and admitted power to alter or amend
the Constitution, peaceably and quietly, whenever experience shall point
out defects or imperfections. And, finally, the people of the United
States have at no time, in no way, directly or indirectly, authorized
any State legislature to construe or interpret _their_ high instrument
of government; much less, to interfere, by their own power, to arrest
its course and operation.

If, Sir, the people in these respects had done otherwise than they have
done, their Constitution could neither have been preserved, nor would it
have been worth preserving. And if its plain provisions shall now be
disregarded, and these new doctrines interpolated in it, it will become
as feeble and helpless a being as its enemies, whether early or more
recent, could possibly desire. It will exist in every State but as a
poor dependent on State permission. It must borrow leave to be; and will
be, no longer than State pleasure, or State discretion, sees fit to
grant the indulgence, and to prolong its poor existence