jority may be found in Congress, but the majority concurrent
must be looked for in the States; that is to say, Sir, stripping the
matter of this novelty of phrase, that the dissent of one or more
States, as States, renders void the decision of a majority of Congress,
so far as that State is concerned. And so this doctrine, running but a
short career, like other dogmas of the day, terminates in nullification.

If this vehement invective against _majorities_ meant no more than that,
in the construction of government, it is wise to provide checks and
balances, so that there should be various limitations on the power of
the mere majority, it would only mean what the Constitution of the
United States has already abundantly provided. It is full of such checks
and balances. In its very organization, it adopts a broad and most
effective principle in restraint of the power of mere majorities. A
majority of the people elects the House of Representatives, but it does
not elect the Senate. The Senate is elected by the States, each State
having, in this respect, an equal power. No law, therefore, can pass,
without the assent of the representatives of the people, and a majority
of the representatives of the States also. A majority of the
representatives of the people must concur, and a majority of the States
must concur, in every act of Congress; and the President is elected on a
plan compounded of both these principles. But having composed one house
of representatives chosen by the people in each State, according to
their numbers, and the other of an equal number of members from every
State, whether larger or smaller, the Constitution gives to majorities
in these houses thus constituted the full and entire power of passing
laws, subject always to the constitutional restrictions and to the
approval of the President. To subject them to any other power is clear
usurpation. The majority of one house may be controlled by the majority
of the other; and both may be restrained by the President's negative.
These are checks and balances provided by the Constitution, existing in
the government itself, and wisely intended to secure deliberation and
caution in legislative proceedings. But to resist the will of the
majority in both houses, thus constitutionally exercised, to insist on
the lawfulness of interposition by an extraneous power; to claim the
right of defeating the will of Congress, by setting up against it the
will of a single State,--i