ncompetent to carry on the government, so as to be satisfactory to the
whole country? Shall we admit that there has so little descended to us
of the wisdom and prudence of our fathers? If the government could be
administered in Washington's time, when it was yet new, when the country
was heavily in debt, when foreign relations were in a threatening
condition, and when Indian wars pressed on the frontiers, can it not be
administered now? Let us not acknowledge ourselves so unequal to our
duties.

Gentlemen, on the occasion referred to by the chair, it became necessary
to consider the judicial power, and its proper functions under the
Constitution. In every free and balanced government, this is a most
essential and important power. Indeed, I think it is a remark of Mr.
Hume, that the administration of justice seems to be the leading object
of institutions of government; that legislatures assemble, that armies
are embodied, that both war and peace are made, with a sort of ultimate
reference to the proper administration of laws, and the judicial
protection of private rights. The judicial power comes home to every
man. If the legislature passes incorrect or unjust general laws, its
members bear the evil as well as others. But judicature acts on
individuals. It touches every private right, every private interest, and
almost every private feeling. What we possess is hardly fit to be called
our own, unless we feel secure in its possession; and this security,
this feeling of perfect safety, cannot exist under a wicked, or even
under a weak and ignorant, administration of the laws. There is no
happiness, there is no liberty, there is no enjoyment of life, unless a
man can say when he rises in the morning, I shall be subject to the
decision of no unjust judge to-day.

But, Gentlemen, the judicial department, under the Constitution of the
United States, possesses still higher duties. It is true, that it may be
called on, and is occasionally called on, to decide questions which are,
in one sense, of a political nature. The general and State governments,
both established by the people, are established for different purposes,
and with different powers. Between those powers questions may arise; and
who shall decide them? Some provision for this end is absolutely
necessary. What shall it be? This was the question before the
Convention; and various schemes were suggested. It was foreseen that the
States might inadvertently pass laws inc