States, were parties to it. We had no other
general government. But that was found insufficient, and inadequate to
the public exigencies. The people were not satisfied with it, and
undertook to establish a better. They undertook to form a general
government, which should stand on a new basis; not a confederacy, not a
league, not a compact between States, but a _Constitution_; a popular
government, founded in popular election, directly responsible to the
people themselves, and divided into branches with prescribed limits of
power, and prescribed duties. They ordained such a government, they gave
it the name of a _Constitution_, and therein they established a
distribution of powers between this, their general government, and their
several State governments. When they shall become dissatisfied with this
distribution, they can alter it. Their own power over their own
instrument remains. But until they shall alter it, it must stand as
their will, and is equally binding on the general government and on the
States.

The gentleman, Sir, finds analogy where I see none. He likens it to the
case of a treaty, in which, there being no common superior, each party
must interpret for itself, under its own obligation of good faith. But
this is not a treaty, but a constitution of government, with powers to
execute itself, and fulfil its duties.

I admit, Sir, that this government is a government of checks and
balances; that is, the House of Representatives is a check on the
Senate, and the Senate is a check on the House, and the President a
check on both. But I cannot comprehend him, or, if I do, I totally
differ from him, when he applies the notion of checks and balances to
the interference of different governments. He argues, that, if we
transgress our constitutional limits, each State, as a State, has a
right to check us. Does he admit the converse of the proposition, that
we have a right to check the States? The gentleman's doctrines would
give us a strange jumble of authorities and powers, instead of
governments of separate and defined powers. It is the part of wisdom, I
think, to avoid this; and to keep the general government and the State
government each in its proper sphere, avoiding as carefully as possible
every kind of interference.

Finally, Sir, the honorable gentleman says, that the States will only
interfere, by their power, to preserve the Constitution. They will not
destroy it, they will not impair it; they will only