government, and of the foundation on which it stands. I hold it
to be a popular government, erected by the people; those who administer
it, responsible to the people; and itself capable of being amended and
modified, just as the people may choose it should be. It is as popular,
just as truly emanating from the people, as the State governments. It is
created for one purpose; the State governments for another. It has its
own powers; they have theirs. There is no more authority with them to
arrest the operation of a law of Congress, than with Congress to arrest
the operation of their laws. We are here to administer a Constitution
emanating immediately from the people, and trusted by them to our
administration. It is not the creature of the State governments. It is
of no moment to the argument, that certain acts of the State
legislatures are necessary to fill our seats in this body. That is not
one of their original State powers, a part of the sovereignty of the
State. It is a duty which the people, by the Constitution itself, have
imposed on the State legislatures; and which they might have left to be
performed elsewhere, if they had seen fit. So they have left the choice
of President with electors; but all this does not affect the proposition
that this whole government, President, Senate, and House of
Representatives, is a popular government. It leaves it still all its
popular character. The governor of a State (in some of the States) is
chosen, not directly by the people, but by those who are chosen by the
people, for the purpose of performing, among other duties, that of
electing a governor. Is the government of the State, on that account,
not a popular government? This government, Sir, is the independent
offspring of the popular will. It is not the creature of State
legislatures; nay, more, if the whole truth must be told, the people
brought it into existence, established it, and have hitherto supported
it, for the very purpose, amongst others, of imposing certain salutary
restraints on State sovereignties. The States cannot now make war; they
cannot contract alliances; they cannot make, each for itself, separate
regulations of commerce; they cannot lay imposts; they cannot coin
money. If this Constitution, Sir, be the creature of State legislatures,
it must be admitted that it has obtained a strange control over the
volitions of its creators.
The people, then, Sir, erected this government. They gave it a
Constitutio
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