it as an instrument of
exchange--would, for all home uses, possess in full perfection the
nature, functions, and powers of money. It is a subject we do not
propose to discuss. It is enough now to say that the notes of the United
States, fundable in national six per cent. bonds, and drawing interest
as they do semi-annually in gold, must be admitted by everybody to be as
safe a currency as the banks as a whole have ever supplied, and to
possess other advantages which make them incomparably a better currency
than that of local banks.

The high price to which gold has been carried by gambling speculators,
is not to be taken as indicating a proportionate want of confidence in
the success of the national cause and in the intrinsic value of the
national securities. It indicates nothing of the sort--at any rate,
whatever it may be taken to indicate, it is none the less true that
United States six per cent. bonds were from the first eagerly sought for
and taken as investments at the rate of a million a day--faster indeed
than the Government could at first supply them; with a constantly
augmenting demand, until in the last week of October _thirty-six_
millions were disposed of--leaving only one hundred and fifty millions
unsold, which will doubtless all be taken before this paper is
published. Comment on this is entirely needless.

OUR FOREIGN RELATIONS.

In the conduct of our _foreign relations_, certain official declarations
in the early part of the war on the policy and purpose of Government in
carrying it on, are to be regretted as gratuitous and unfortunate. It is
to be regretted also that the capture of the _Trent_ and the seizure of
Mason and Slidell was not at once disavowed as being contrary to our
doctrine on neutral rights, and the rebel emissaries surrendered without
waiting for reclamation on the part of the British Government; or, if it
was thought best to await that reclamation as containing a virtual
concession of our doctrine, it would have been better--more dignified
and effective--if the reply had been limited to a simple statement that
the surrender was necessitated by the principles always maintained by
our Government, and not by a reclamation which the British Government,
by its own construction of public law and by its own practice, was not
entitled to make, but which being made, might now, it was to be hoped,
be taken as an abandonment in the future of the ground heretofore
maintained by that Govern