ho held lands _in capite_ of the king, were
obliged to attend him in his wars with a certain number of men, who
all held lands from them at easy rents on that condition. These fought
without pay, and when the service was over, returned again to their
farms. It is recorded of William Rufus, that being absent in Normandy,
and engaged in a war with his brother, he ordered twenty thousand men to
be raised, and sent over from hence to supply his army;[3] but having
struck up a peace before they were embarked, he gave them leave to
disband, on condition they would pay him ten shillings a man, which
amounted to a mighty sum in those days.

Consider a kingdom as a great family, whereof the prince is the father,
and it will appear plainly that mercenary troops are only servants armed,
either to awe the children at home; or else to defend from invaders, the
family who are otherwise employed, and choose to contribute out of their
stock for paying their defenders, rather than leave their affairs to be
neglected in their absence. The art of making soldiery a trade, and
keeping armies in pay, seems in Europe to have had two originals. The
first was usurpation, when popular men destroyed the liberties of their
country, and seized the power into their own hands, which they were
forced to maintain by hiring guards to bridle the people. Such were
anciently the tyrants in most of the small states in Greece, and such
were those in several parts of Italy, about three or four centuries ago,
as Machiavel informs us. The other original of mercenary armies, seems to
have risen from larger kingdoms or commonwealths, which had subdued
provinces at a distance, and were forced to maintain troops upon them, to
prevent insurrections from the natives: Of this sort were Macedon,
Carthage and Rome of old; Venice and Holland at this day; as well as most
kingdoms of Europe. So that mercenary forces in a free state, whether
monarchy or commonwealth, seem only necessary, either for preserving
their conquests, (which in such governments it is not prudent to extend
too far) or else for maintaining a war at distance.

In this last, which at present is our most important case, there are
certain maxims that all wise governments have observed.

The first I shall mention is, that no private man should have a
commission to be general for life,[4] let his merit and services be ever
so great. Or, if a prince be unadvisedly brought to offer such a
commission in one