hand, let him (to save time and blood) deliver up his
crown with the other. The Romans in the height and perfection of their
government, usually sent out one of the new consuls to be general against
their most formidable enemy, and recalled the old one, who often returned
before the next election, and according as he had merit was sent to
command in some other part, which perhaps was continued to him for a
second, and sometimes a third year. But if Paulus Aemilius,[5] or
Scipio[6] himself, had presumed to move the Senate to continue their
commissions for life, they certainly would have fallen a sacrifice to the
jealousy of the people. Caesar indeed (between whom and a certain
general, some of late with much discretion have made a parallel) had his
command in Gaul continued to him for five years, and was afterwards made
perpetual Dictator, that is to say, general for life, which gave him the
power and the will of utterly destroying the Roman liberty. But in his
time the Romans were very much degenerated, and great corruptions crept
into their morals and discipline. However, we see there still were some
remains of a noble spirit among them; for when Caesar sent to be chosen
consul, notwithstanding his absence, they decreed he should come in
person, give up his command, and _petere more majorum._[7]

It is not impossible but a general may desire such a commission out of
inadvertency, at the instigation of his friends, or perhaps of his
enemies, or merely for the benefit and honour of it, without intending
any such dreadful consequences; and in that case, a wise prince or state
may barely refuse it without shewing any marks of their displeasure. But
the request in its own nature is highly criminal, and ought to be entered
so upon record, to terrify others in time to come from venturing to make
it.

Another maxim to be observed by a free state engaged in war, is to keep
the military power in absolute subjection to the civil, nor ever suffer
the former to influence or interfere with the latter. A general and his
army are servants hired by the civil power to act as they are directed
from thence, and with a commission large or limited as the administration
shall think fit; for which they are largely paid in profit and honour.
The whole system by which armies are governed, is quite alien from the
peaceful institutions of states at home; and if the rewards be so
inviting as to tempt a senator to take a post in the army, while he