orse by the
tampering of mountebanks, there is nothing left but to call in the best
physicians before the case grows desperate: But I would ask, whether
France or any other kingdom, would have made so little use of such
prodigious opportunities, the fruits whereof could never have fallen to
the ground, without the extremist degree of folly and corruption, and
where those have lain, let the world judge? Instead of aiming at peace,
while we had the advantage of the war, which has been the perpetual maxim
of all wise states, it has been reckoned factious and malignant even to
express our wishes for it; and such a condition imposed, as was never
offered to any prince who had an inch of ground to dispute; _Quae enim
est conditio pacis; in qua ei cum quo pacem facias, nihil concedi
potest?_[8]

It is not obvious to conceive what could move men who sat at home, and
were called to consult upon the good of the kingdom, to be so utterly
averse from putting an end to a long expensive war, which the victorious,
as well as conquered side, were heartily weary of. Few or none of them
were men of the sword; they had no share in the honour; they had made
large fortunes, and were at the head of all affairs. But they well knew
by what tenure they held their power; that the Qu[een] saw through their
designs, that they had entirely lost the hearts of the clergy; that the
landed men were against them; that they were detested by the body of the
people; and that nothing bore them up but their credit with the bank and
other stocks, which would be neither formidable nor necessary when the
war was at an end. For these reasons they resolved to disappoint all
overtures of a peace, till they and their party should be so deeply
rooted as to make it impossible to shake them. To this end, they began to
precipitate matters so fast, as in a little time must have ruined the
constitution, if the crown had not interposed, and rather ventured the
accidental effects of their malice, than such dreadful consequences of
their power. And indeed, had the former danger been greater than some
hoped or feared, I see no difficulty in the choice, which was the same
with his, who said, "he had rather be devoured by wolves than by rats." I
therefore still insist that we cannot wonder at, or find fault with the
army, for concurring with a ministry who was for prolonging the war. The
inclination is natural in them all, pardonable in those who have not yet
made their fortun