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inadequate to the solution of the problem. This scrutiny consisted in searching for the ground of "contradiction"[571] with regard to each opinion founded on sensation, and showing that opposite views were equally tenable. It inquired on what ground these opinions were maintained, and what consequences flowed therefrom, and it showed that the grounds upon which "opinion" was founded, and the conclusions which were drawn from it, were contradictory, and consequently untrue.[572] "They," the Dialecticians, "examined the opinions of men as if they were error; and bringing them together by a reasoning process to the same point, they placed them by the side of each other: and by so placing, they showed that _the opinions are at one and the same time contrary to themselves, about the same things, with reference to the same circumstances, and according to the same premises_."[573] And inasmuch as the same attribute can not, at the same time, be affirmed and denied of the same subject,[574] therefore a thing can not be at once "changeable" and "unchangeable," "movable" and "immovable," "generated" and "eternal."[575] The objects of sense, however generalized and classified, can only give the contingent, the relative, and the finite; therefore the permanent ground and sufficient reason of all phenomenal existence can not be found in opinions and judgments founded upon sensation. [Footnote 571: "The Dialectitian is one who syllogistically infers the contradictions implied in popular opinions."--Aristotle, "Sophist," Secs. 1, 2.] [Footnote 572: "Republic," bk. vi. ch. xiii.] [Footnote 573: "Sophist," Sec. 33; "Republic," bk. iv. ch. xii.] [Footnote 574: See the "Phaedo," Sec. 119, and "Republic," bk. iv. ch. xiii., where the Law of Non-contradiction is announced.] [Footnote 575 "Parmenides," Sec. 3.] The dialectic process thus consisted almost entirely of _refutation_,[576] or what both he and Aristotle denominated _elenchus_ (elenchos)--a process of reasoning by which the contradictory of a given proposition is inferred. "When refutation had done its utmost, and all the points of difficulty and objection had been fully brought out, the dialectic method had accomplished its purpose; and the affirmation which remained, after this discussion, might be regarded as setting forth the truth of the question under consideration;"[577] or in other words, _when a system of error is destroyed by refutation, the contradictory op
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