y had none. It had been
manifest long before these armies were gradually drawn into the fight
that they would suffer heavy wastage, and that they would speedily
become mere skeletons unless they had ample backing from home. Had the
branches of the War Office which were supposed to deal with these
questions been allowed their own way in regard to them, I imagine
that greater foresight would have been displayed and that some
confusion might have been avoided.

The preceding paragraphs read perhaps rather like a deliberate attempt
to belittle the achievements of the greatest of our War Ministers. But
they only touch upon one side, the dark side so to speak, of Lord
Kitchener's work as an organizer and administrator during the Great
War. Little has been said hitherto as to the other and much more
important side, the bright side, of that work.

The marvels that he accomplished in respect to multiplying the land
forces of the nation by creating improvised armies as it were by
magic, have put in the shade a feat for which Lord Kitchener has never
been given sufficient credit. Prior to August 1914, no organization
existed for placing any portions of our regular army in the field in a
Continental theatre of war, other than the Expeditionary Force and one
additional division. The additional division was to be constituted if
possible on the outbreak of war out of infantry to be withdrawn from
certain foreign garrisons, and spare artillery, engineer and
departmental units that existed in the United Kingdom. That additional
division, the Seventh, was despatched to the Western Front within two
months of mobilization. But Lord Kitchener also organized four further
regular divisions, the Eighth, Twenty-seventh, Twenty-eighth and
Twenty-ninth, of which the first three were in the field within five
months of mobilization, joining Sir J. French respectively in
November, December and January, and the remaining one was nearly ready
to take the field by the end of the six months. The Secretary of State
prepared for this immediately on taking up office, by recalling
practically the whole of the regulars on foreign service, with the
exception of the British troops included in four mixed Indian
divisions. Would any War Minister other than Lord Kitchener have had
the courage to denude India of British regular troops, artillery as
well as infantry, to the extent that he did? Supposing any other War
Minister to have proposed such a thing, would