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d by Prince Lichnowsky to Sir Edward Grey on Aug. 1, 1914, as reported in the English "White Book," No. 123, when the former asked Sir Edward Grey whether if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality England would engage to remain neutral, upon which Grey replied that he could not say that. It is therefore perfectly evident, in the first place, that in case of a German war, that was sure to be brought about by Russia's mobilization against Germany, England would go to war against Germany, and it has been proved that the English assurance to that effect has strengthened the hands of the Russian war party, which thereupon got the upper hand and forced the Russian Czar into the war, (see report of Belgian Charge d'Affaires at St. Petersburg to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Brussels, July 30.) In the second place, it is shown that England meant, with or without Belgium's will, to land her troops, in violation of Belgium's neutrality, in Belgium, irrespective of whether German troops were marching through Belgium or not, because no such declaration had been made in 1912 or any time thereafter until Aug. 4 in the German Reichstag. It is further evident that as soon as Russia mobilized, Germany would have to fight Russia as well as France and England, and that in such a fight she was forced to draw quickly when she saw her enemies reaching for their hip pockets. And only the prompt action at Liege that put this important railway centre commanding the railway connections to France and Germany into German hands prevented the English landing and invading Belgium. The guilt of the Belgian Government in this matter consists, in the first place, in making and concerting plans with the English and French Governments as to what steps to take in case of war. A plan of the French mobilization was found in the same docket, and it cannot be presumed that the conference between British and French experts was unknown to the British Military Attache in Brussels. It is furthermore impossible to believe that the French railway for the shipping of British troops from Calais, Dunkirk, and Boulogne into Belgium in Belgian cars could have been used without the knowledge of the French authorities. Secondly, that Belgium did not heed the advice of Baron Greindl and did not try to insure her independence in the same way by approaching Germany and making a similar contract with her. This disposes of the contention that the B
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