s assertion. We have positive evidence
of it.

"Evidently the project of an outflanking movement from the north forms
part of the scheme of the entente cordiale. If that were not the case,
then the plan of fortifying Flushing would not have called forth such
an outburst in Paris and London. The reason why they wished that the
Scheldt should remain unfortified was hardly concealed by them. Their
aim was to be able to transport an English garrison, unhindered, to
Antwerp, which means to establish in our country a basis of operation
for an offensive in the direction of the Lower Rhine and Westphalia,
and then to make us throw our lot in with them, which would not be
difficult, for, after the surrender of our national centre of refuge,
we would, through our own fault, renounce every possibility of
opposing the demands of our doubtful protectors after having been so
unwise as to permit their entrance into our country. Col.
Barnardiston's announcements at the time of the conclusion of the
entente cordiale, which were just as perfidious as they were naive,
have shown us plainly the true meaning of things. When it became
evident that we would not allow ourselves to be frightened by the
pretended danger of the closing of the Scheldt, the plan was not
entirely abandoned, but modified in so far as the British Army was not
to land on the Belgian coast, but at the nearest French harbors.

"The revelations of Capt. Faber, which were denied as little as the
newspaper reports by which they were confirmed or completed in several
respects, also testify to this. This British Army, at Calais and
Dunkirk, would by no means march along our frontier to Longwy in order
to reach Germany. It would directly invade Belgium from the northwest.
That would give it the advantage of being able to begin operations
immediately, to encounter the Belgian Army in a region where we could
not depend on any fortress, in case we wanted to risk a battle.
Moreover, that would make it possible for it to occupy provinces rich
in all kinds of resources and, at any rate, to prevent our
mobilization or only to permit it after we had formally pledged
ourselves to carry on our mobilization to the exclusive advantage of
England and her allies.

"It is therefore of necessity to prepare a plan of battle for the
Belgian Army also for that possibility. This is necessary in the
interest of our military defense as well as for the sake of the
direction of our foreign policy