neutrality and that the British spirit was clearly shown by
the words of Col. Barnardiston that the Scheldt might be used for
transporting troops into Belgium.

Furthermore, it will be remembered that the British and French
Governments violently protested when the plans were made public that
the Dutch Government intended to fortify the mouth of the Scheldt in
1906. But in 1912, when the Balkan crisis became acute, the British
went one step further. When Col. Bridges, in a conversation with Gen.
Jungbluth, the Chief of the Belgian General Staff, said that England
was ready to strike, that 160,000 men were ready to be landed and that
they would land them as soon as any European conflict should break
out, Gen. Jungbluth protested that for such a step the permission of
Belgium was necessary. The cool reply was that the English knew it,
but thought that, as Belgium was not strong enough alone to protect
herself, England would land troops anyway. Gen. Jungbluth answered
that Belgium felt strong enough to protect herself, which is in
keeping with her declaration to France, when she offered to protect
Belgium by five army corps, as reported in the British "White Book."
The position of England was therefore that, while in 1906 they had
already concerted plans for a joint action, in 1912 England intended
action in any case, should a European conflagration break out.

Now, it must be recollected that as early as July 28, 1914, Sir Edward
Grey said to Prince Lichnowsky, as mentioned in his communication to
Sir E. Goschen: "The situation was very grave. While it was restricted
to the issues at present actually involved, we had not thought of
interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it and then
France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European
interests, and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of
our conversation--which I hoped would continue--into thinking that we
should stand aside." (British "White Papers," No. 89.)

This was at a time when the Belgian issue had not been raised at all.
It only came about by Sir Edward Grey's notes written on July 31. Thus
the British entanglement with France, as evidenced by the British
"White Book," prevented England taking the same attitude in 1914 which
she had taken in 1870, when she made a treaty with France as against
the German invasion of Belgium and with Germany as against the French
invasion of Belgium. A similar agreement was suggeste