tion concerning the chief command of
the allied forces.

"He inquired whether our preparations were sufficient to secure the
defense of the country during the crossing and the transportation of
the English troops--which he estimated to last about ten days.

"I answered him that the places Namur and Liege were protected from a
coup de main and that our field army of 100,000 men would be capable
of intervention within four days.

"After having expressed his full satisfaction with my explanations, my
visitor laid emphasis on the following facts: (1) That our
conversation was entirely confidential; (2) that it was not binding on
his Government; (3) that his Minister, the English General Staff, he
and I were, up to the present, the only ones[1] informed about the
matter; (4) that he did not know whether the opinion of his sovereign
had been consulted....

[Footnote 1: This is similar to the manner in which the English
entente with France was arranged. The British Parliament and the
British Cabinet were kept in ignorance of the fact that English and
French naval experts were consulting together. The British Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, repeatedly assured the country
that Great Britain's hands were free. Yet, when the crisis came, this
quite unofficial exchange of military views and plans, this mere
gentleman's agreement, revealed itself, of course, as a binding
obligation. Nations do not reveal their military secrets to each other
except on the clear understanding that an alliance is in force.]

"In a following discussion Lieut. Col. Barnardiston assured me that he
had never received confidential reports of the other Military Attaches
about our army. He then gave the exact numerical data of the English
forces; we could depend on it, that in twelve or thirteen days two
army corps, four cavalry brigades, and two brigades of horse infantry
would be landed.

"He asked me to study the question of the transport of these forces to
that part of the country where they would be useful, and he promised
to give me for this purpose details about the composition of the
landing army.

"He reverted to the question concerning the effective strength of our
field army, and he emphasized that no detachments should be sent from
this army to Namur and Liege, because these places were provided with
garrisons of sufficient strength.

"He asked me to direct my attention to the necessity of granting the
English Army the ad