nguished valour in the cause of Athens, the Plataeans
who escaped from the siege, metics and strangers who offered to serve
in the army, the slaves who fought at Arginusae,--all these could or
did become citizens. Even those who were only on one side of Athenian
parentage were at more than one period accounted citizens. But at times
there seems to have arisen a feeling against this promiscuous extension
of the citizen body, an expression of which is to be found in the law
of Pericles--monous Athenaious einai tous ek duoin Athenaion gegonotas
(Plutarch, Pericles); and at no time did the adopted citizen enjoy the
full rights of citizenship--e.g. he might not be elected archon or to
the office of priest (Telfy), although this prohibition did not extend
to his children, if born of a citizen wife. Plato never thinks of making
the metic, much less the slave, a citizen. His treatment of the former
class is at once more gentle and more severe than that which prevailed
at Athens. He imposes upon them no tax but good behaviour, whereas at
Athens they were required to pay twelve drachmae per annum, and to
have a patron: on the other hand, he only allows them to reside in the
Magnesian state on condition of following a trade; they were required to
depart when their property exceeded that of the third class, and in any
case after a residence of twenty years, unless they could show that they
had conferred some great benefit on the state. This privileged position
reflects that of the isoteleis at Athens, who were excused from the
metoikion. It is Plato's greatest concession to the metic, as the
bestowal of freedom is his greatest concession to the slave.

Lastly, there is a more general point of view under which the Laws of
Plato may be considered,--the principles of Jurisprudence which are
contained in them. These are not formally announced, but are scattered
up and down, to be observed by the reflective reader for himself. Some
of them are only the common principles which all courts of justice have
gathered from experience; others are peculiar and characteristic. That
judges should sit at fixed times and hear causes in a regular order,
that evidence should be laid before them, that false witnesses should
be disallowed, and corruption punished, that defendants should be
heard before they are convicted,--these are the rules, not only of the
Hellenic courts, but of courts of law in all ages and countries.
But there are also points which