etched and lives in misery? As the poet says, and with truth:
I sing not, I care not about him who accomplishes all noble things,
not having justice; let him who 'draws near and stretches out his hand
against his enemies be a just man.' But if he be unjust, I would not
have him 'look calmly upon bloody death,' nor 'surpass in swiftness the
Thracian Boreas;' and let no other thing that is called good ever be
his. For the goods of which the many speak are not really good: first
in the catalogue is placed health, beauty next, wealth third; and then
innumerable others, as for example to have a keen eye or a quick ear,
and in general to have all the senses perfect; or, again, to be a tyrant
and do as you like; and the final consummation of happiness is to have
acquired all these things, and when you have acquired them to become at
once immortal. But you and I say, that while to the just and holy all
these things are the best of possessions, to the unjust they are all,
including even health, the greatest of evils. For in truth, to have
sight, and hearing, and the use of the senses, or to live at all without
justice and virtue, even though a man be rich in all the so-called goods
of fortune, is the greatest of evils, if life be immortal; but not so
great, if the bad man lives only a very short time. These are the truths
which, if I am not mistaken, you will persuade or compel your poets to
utter with suitable accompaniments of harmony and rhythm, and in these
they must train up your youth. Am I not right? For I plainly declare
that evils as they are termed are goods to the unjust, and only evils
to the just, and that goods are truly good to the good, but evil to the
evil. Let me ask again, Are you and I agreed about this?
CLEINIAS: I think that we partly agree and partly do not.
ATHENIAN: When a man has health and wealth and a tyranny which lasts,
and when he is pre-eminent in strength and courage, and has the gift of
immortality, and none of the so-called evils which counter-balance these
goods, but only the injustice and insolence of his own nature--of such
an one you are, I suspect, unwilling to believe that he is miserable
rather than happy.
CLEINIAS: That is quite true.
ATHENIAN: Once more: Suppose that he be valiant and strong, and handsome
and rich, and does throughout his whole life whatever he likes, still,
if he be unrighteous and insolent, would not both of you agree that he
will of necessity live basely? You
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