reement between
the sense of pleasure and the judgment of reason in the soul is, in my
opinion, the worst ignorance; and also the greatest, because affecting
the great mass of the human soul; for the principle which feels pleasure
and pain in the individual is like the mass or populace in a state. And
when the soul is opposed to knowledge, or opinion, or reason, which are
her natural lords, that I call folly, just as in the state, when the
multitude refuses to obey their rulers and the laws; or, again, in the
individual, when fair reasonings have their habitation in the soul and
yet do no good, but rather the reverse of good. All these cases I term
the worst ignorance, whether in individuals or in states. You will
understand, Stranger, that I am speaking of something which is very
different from the ignorance of handicraftsmen.

CLEINIAS: Yes, my friend, we understand and agree.

ATHENIAN: Let us, then, in the first place declare and affirm that the
citizen who does not know these things ought never to have any kind of
authority entrusted to him: he must be stigmatized as ignorant,
even though he be versed in calculation and skilled in all sorts of
accomplishments, and feats of mental dexterity; and the opposite are to
be called wise, even although, in the words of the proverb, they know
neither how to read nor how to swim; and to them, as to men of sense,
authority is to be committed. For, O my friends, how can there be the
least shadow of wisdom when there is no harmony? There is none; but the
noblest and greatest of harmonies may be truly said to be the greatest
wisdom; and of this he is a partaker who lives according to reason;
whereas he who is devoid of reason is the destroyer of his house and
the very opposite of a saviour of the state: he is utterly ignorant of
political wisdom. Let this, then, as I was saying, be laid down by us.

CLEINIAS: Let it be so laid down.

ATHENIAN: I suppose that there must be rulers and subjects in states?

CLEINIAS: Certainly.

ATHENIAN: And what are the principles on which men rule and obey in
cities, whether great or small; and similarly in families? What are
they, and how many in number? Is there not one claim of authority
which is always just,--that of fathers and mothers and in general of
progenitors to rule over their offspring?

CLEINIAS: There is.

ATHENIAN: Next follows the principle that the noble should rule over the
ignoble; and, thirdly, that the elder should r