I think that Cleinias is the person to
be consulted, for his is the state which is going to use these laws.

CLEINIAS: Thank you, Megillus.

ATHENIAN: Whether, in the abstract, words are to be many or few, is a
very foolish question; the best form, and not the shortest, is to be
approved; nor is length at all to be regarded. Of the two forms of law
which have been recited, the one is not only twice as good in practical
usefulness as the other, but the case is like that of the two kinds
of doctors, which I was just now mentioning. And yet legislators never
appear to have considered that they have two instruments which they
might use in legislation--persuasion and force; for in dealing with the
rude and uneducated multitude, they use the one only as far as they can;
they do not mingle persuasion with coercion, but employ force pure and
simple. Moreover, there is a third point, sweet friends, which ought to
be, and never is, regarded in our existing laws.

CLEINIAS: What is it?

ATHENIAN: A point arising out of our previous discussion, which comes
into my mind in some mysterious way. All this time, from early dawn
until noon, have we been talking about laws in this charming retreat:
now we are going to promulgate our laws, and what has preceded was only
the prelude of them. Why do I mention this? For this reason:--Because
all discourses and vocal exercises have preludes and overtures, which
are a sort of artistic beginnings intended to help the strain which
is to be performed; lyric measures and music of every other kind have
preludes framed with wonderful care. But of the truer and higher
strain of law and politics, no one has ever yet uttered any prelude, or
composed or published any, as though there was no such thing in
nature. Whereas our present discussion seems to me to imply that there
is;--these double laws, of which we were speaking, are not exactly
double, but they are in two parts, the law and the prelude of the law.
The arbitrary command, which was compared to the commands of doctors,
whom we described as of the meaner sort, was the law pure and simple;
and that which preceded, and was described by our friend here as
being hortatory only, was, although in fact, an exhortation, likewise
analogous to the preamble of a discourse. For I imagine that all this
language of conciliation, which the legislator has been uttering in the
preface of the law, was intended to create good-will in the person whom
he addresse