oberts, but Ayoob remained in possession of Herat and the whole of
the country west of the Helmund. It was well known that the rivalry
between him and his cousin Abdurrahman did not admit of being patched
up, and that it could only be settled by the sword. At the moment
there was more reason to believe in the military talent of Ayoob than
of the present Ameer, and it was certain that the instant we left
Candahar the two opponents would engage in a struggle for its
possession. The policy of precipitate evacuation left everything to
the chapter of accidents, and if Ayoob had proved the victor, or even
able to hold his ground, the situation in Afghanistan would have been
eminently favourable for that foreign intervention which only the
extraordinary skill and still more extraordinary success of the Ameer
Abdurrahman has averted. In giving the actual text of Gordon's letter,
it is only right, while frankly admitting that the course pursued has
proved most successful and beneficial, to record that it might well
have been otherwise, and that as a mere matter of argument the
probability was quite the other way. Neither Gordon nor any other
supporter of the evacuation policy ventured to predict that
Abdurrahman, who was then not a young man, and whose early career had
been one of failure, was going to prove himself the ablest
administrator and most astute statesman in Afghan history.
"Those who advocate the retention of Candahar do so generally on
the ground that its retention would render more difficult the
advance of Russia on, and would prevent her fomenting rebellion
in, India, and that our prestige in India would suffer by its
evacuation.
"I think that this retention would throw Afghanistan, in the hope
of regaining Candahar, into alliance with Russia, and that
thereby Russia would be given a temptation to offer which she
otherwise would not have. Supposing that temptation did not
exist, what other inducement could Russia offer for this
alliance? The plunder of India. If, then, Russia did advance, she
would bring her auxiliary tribes, who, with their natural
predatory habits, would soon come to loggerheads with their
natural enemies, the Afghans, and that the sooner when these
latter were aided by us. Would the Afghans in such a case be
likely to be tempted by the small share they would get of the
plunder of India to give up their secu
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