m those
social and economic interests which necessarily link our career with
continental nations. So we became part of the continental system, and it
became necessary for us to choose friends and partners and mark off other
peoples as our enemies. It might have been possible a certain number of
years ago for us to join the Triple Alliance. At one time Prince Buelow
seemed anxious that we should do so, and Mr. Chamberlain on our side was
by no means unwilling. But gradually we discovered that Germany was
intensely jealous of us as a colonial power and as a great sea-power, and
for this reason, as well as for others, we preferred to compose our
ancient differences with France and promote an understanding between
English and French as the nearest of neighbours and the most convenient of
allies. Observe, however, that every step in the process was a challenge,
and a challenge which the rival aimed at could not possibly ignore. The
conclusion of the French Entente Cordiale in 1904, the launching of the
_Dreadnought_ in 1906, the formation of the Russian agreement in 1907, and
certain changes which we made in our own army were obviously intended as
warnings to Germany that we were dangerous people to attack.[5] Germany
naturally sought reprisals in her fashion, and gradually Europe was
transformed into a huge armed camp, divided into two powerful
organisations which necessarily watched each other with no friendly gaze.

[5] See _The War of Steel and Gold_, by H.N. Brailsford (Bell)--opening
chapter on "The Balance of Power."

BALANCE OR CONCERT?

I do not say that the course of events could possibly have been altered.
When once we became part of the continental system, it was necessary for
us to choose between friends and enemies. I only say that if diplomacy
calls itself an agency for preventing war, it cannot be said to be
altogether successful. Its famous doctrine of a Balance of Power is in
reality a mere phrase. If one combination be represented as X and the
other as Y, and X increases itself up to X^2, it becomes necessary that Y
should similarly increase itself to Y^2, a process which, clearly, does
not make for peace. I should imagine that the best of diplomatists are
quite aware of this. Indeed, there seems reason to suppose that Sir Edward
Grey, owing to definite experience in the last two years, not only
discovered the uselessness of the principle of a Balance of Power, but did
his best to substitute something