s, and that
thus in a fashion each nation will have its proper say in any of the
conclusions arrived at. But here the difficulty starts anew owing to the
relative size, and therefore the relative importance of the different
states constituting the union. If all alike are given an equivalent vote,
it is rather hard on the big states, which represent larger numbers and
therefore control larger destinies. If, on the other hand, we adopt the
principle of proportional representation, we may be pretty certain that
the larger states will press somewhat heavily on the smaller. For
instance, suppose that some state violates, or threatens to violate, the
public law of the world. In that case the Universal Union must, of course,
try to bring it to reason by peaceful means first, but if that should
fail, the only other alternative is by force of arms. If once we admit the
right of the world-organisation to coerce its recalcitrant members, what
becomes of the sovereign independence of nations? That, as we have said,
was the main difficulty confronting the European peace-maker of a hundred
years ago, and, however we may choose to regard it, it remains a
difficulty, we will not say insuperable, but at all events exceedingly
formidable, for the European peace-makers of the twentieth century. The
antithesis is the old antithesis between order and progress; between
coercion and independence; between the public voice, or, if we like to
phrase it so, the public conscience, and the arbitrariness and
irresponsibility of individual units. Or we might put the problem in a
still wider form. A patriot is a man who believes intensely in the rights
of his own nationality. But if we have to form a United States of Europe
we shall have gradually to soften, diminish, or perhaps even destroy the
narrower conceptions of patriotism. The ultimate evolution of democracy in
the various peoples means the mutual recognition of their common
interests, as against despotism and autocracy. It is clear that such a
process must gradually wipe out the distinction between the different
peoples, and substitute for particularism something of universal import.
In such a process what, we ask once more, becomes of the principle of
nationality, which is one of our immediate aims? In point of fact, it is
obvious that, from a strictly logical standpoint, the will of Europe, or
the public right of Europe, and the free independence of nationalities are
antithetical terms, and w