National Leader Press, Manchester). See also
_The War of Steel and Gold_, by H.N. Brailsford, Chapter II, "Real
Politics," p. 89. The sentences quoted from Mr. Wells come from _The War
that will end War_ (F. and C. Palmer), p. 39.
FINANCIAL INTERESTS
It has already been remarked that the conditions which limit and control
the size of armaments are partly geographical and partly financial, and
that while the former represent the minimum, the latter stand for the
maximum of protective force. I need say nothing further about the
geographical conditions. Every one who studies a map can see for himself
what is required by a country anxious to protect its shores or its
boundaries. If we suppose that armaments are strictly limited to the needs
of self-defence, and if we further assume that in the new Europe countries
are not animated by the strongest dislikes against one another, but are
prepared to live and let live (a tolerably large assumption, I am aware),
we can readily imagine a steady process of curtailment in the absolutely
necessary armament. Further, if Great Britain gave up its doctrine of the
Right of Capture at Sea (and if Great Britain surrendered it, we may be
pretty sure that, after Germany has been made powerless, no other country
would wish to retain it), the supposed necessity of protecting lines of
commerce would disappear and a further reduction in cruisers would take
place. I cannot imagine that either America or Japan would wish to revive
the Right of Capture theory if we ourselves had given it up. And they are
the most important maritime and commercial nations after ourselves.[15]
The financial conditions, however, deserve study because they lead
straight to the very heart of the modern bellicose tendencies. In an
obvious and superficial sense, financial conditions represent the maximum
in the provision of armaments, because ultimately it becomes a question of
how much a nation can afford to spend without going bankrupt or being
fatally hampered in its expenditure on necessary social reforms. This,
however, is not perhaps the most significant point. Financial conditions
act much more subtly than this. Why has it grown so imperative on states
to have large armies or large navies, or both? Because--so we have been
told over and over again--diplomacy cannot speak with effect unless it is
backed by power. And what are the main occasions on which diplomacy has to
speak effectively? We should be incline
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