a greater degree,
and is of more durable influence. Whatever is related to us is conceived
in a lively manner by the easy transition from ourselves to the related
object. Custom also, or acquaintance facilitates the entrance, and
strengthens the conception of any object. The first case is parallel to
our reasonings from cause and effect; the second to education. And as
reasoning and education concur only in producing a lively and strong
idea of any object; so is this the only particular, which is common
to relation and acquaintance. This must, therefore, be the influencing
quality, by which they produce all their common effects; and love or
kindness being one of these effects, it must be from the force and
liveliness of conception, that the passion is derived. Such a conception
is peculiarly agreeable, and makes us have an affectionate regard for
every thing, that produces it, when the proper object of kindness and
goodwill.
It is obvious, that people associate together according to their
particular tempers and dispositions, and that men of gay tempers
naturally love the gay; as the serious bear an affection to the serious.
This not only happens, where they remark this resemblance betwixt
themselves and others, but also by the natural course of the
disposition, and by a certain sympathy, which always arises betwixt
similar characters. Where they remark the resemblance, it operates after
the manner of a relation, by producing a connexion of ideas. Where
they do not remark it, it operates by some other principle; and if this
latter principle be similar to the former, it must be received as a
confirmation of the foregoing reasoning.
The idea of ourselves is always intimately present to us, and conveys a
sensible degree of vivacity to the idea of any other object, to which we
are related. This lively idea changes by degrees into a real impression;
these two kinds of perception being in a great measure the same, and
differing only in their degrees of force and vivacity. But this change
must be produced with the greater ease, that our natural temper gives
us a propensity to the same impression, which we observe in others,
and makes it arise upon any slight occasion. In that case resemblance
converts the idea into an impression, not only by means of the relation,
and by transfusing the original vivacity into the related idea; but also
by presenting such materials as take fire from the least spark. And as
in both cases a lo
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