roves that the cause Is a compounded one.
Twould be tedious to trace the passions of love and hatred, through all
the observations which we have formed concerning pride and humility,
and which are equally applicable to both sets of passions. Twill be
sufficient to remark in general, that the object of love and hatred is
evidently some thinking person; and that the sensation of the former
passion is always agreeable, and of the latter uneasy. We may also
suppose with some shew of probability, THAT THE CAUSE OF BOTH THESE
PASSIONS IS ALWAYS RELATED TO A THINKING BEING, AND THAT THE CAUSE OF
THE FORMER PRODUCE A SEPARATE PLEASURE, AND OF THE LATTER A SEPARATE
UNEASINESS.
One of these suppositions, viz, that the cause of love and hatred must
be related to a person or thinking being, in order to produce these
passions, is not only probable, but too evident to be contested. Virtue
and vice, when considered in the abstract; beauty and deformity, when
placed on inanimate objects; poverty and riches when belonging to a
third person, excite no degree of love or hatred, esteem or contempt
towards those, who have no relation to them. A person looking out at a
window, sees me in the street, and beyond me a beautiful palace, with
which I have no concern: I believe none will pretend, that this person
will pay me the same respect, as if I were owner of the palace.
It is not so evident at first sight, that a relation of impressions is
requisite to these passions, and that because in the transition the one
impression is so much confounded with the other, that they become in a
manner undistinguishable. But as in pride and humility, we have easily
been able to make the separation, and to prove, that every cause of
these passions, produces a separate pain or pleasure, I might here
observe the same method with the same success, in examining particularly
the several causes of love and hatred. But as I hasten a full and
decisive proof of these systems, I delay this examination for a moment:
And in the mean time shall endeavour to convert to my present purpose
all my reaaonings concerning pride and humility, by an argument that
is founded on unquestionable examination.
There are few persons, that are satisfyed with their own character, or
genius, or fortune, who are nor desirous of shewing themselves to the
world, and of acquiring the love and approbation of mankind. Now it is
evident, that the very same qualities and circumstances, whic
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