humility.

It has been observed in treating of the understanding, that the
distinction, which we sometimes make betwixt a power and the exercise
of it, is entirely frivolous, and that neither man nor any other being
ought ever to be thought possest of any ability, unless it be exerted
and put in action. But though this be strictly true in a just and
philosophical way of thinking, it is certain it is not the philosophy
of our passions; but that many things operate upon them by means of the
idea and supposition of power, independent of its actual exercise. We
are pleased when we acquire an ability of procuring pleasure, and are
displeased when another acquires a power of giving pain. This is evident
from experience; but in order to give a just explication of the matter,
and account for this satisfaction and uneasiness, we must weigh the
following reflections.

It is evident the error of distinguishing power from its exercise
proceeds not entirely from the scholastic doctrine of free-will, which,
indeed, enters very little into common life, and has but small influence
on our vulgar and popular ways of thinking. According to that doctrine,
motives deprive us not of free-will, nor take away our power of
performing or forbearing any action. But according to common notions a
man has no power, where very considerable motives lie betwixt him and
the satisfaction of his desires, and determine him to forbear what he
wishes to perform. I do not think I have fallen into my enemy's power,
when I see him pass me in the streets with a sword by his side, while
I am unprovided of any weapon. I know that the fear of the civil
magistrate is as strong a restraint as any of iron, and that I am in as
perfect safety as if he were chained or imprisoned. But when a person
acquires such an authority over me, that not only there is no external
obstacle to his actions; but also that he may punish or reward me as he
pleases, without any dread of punishment in his turn, I then attribute a
full power to him, and consider myself as his subject or vassal.

Now if we compare these two cases, that of a person, who has very
strong motives of interest or safety to forbear any action, and that of
another, who lies under no such obligation, we shall find, according
to the philosophy explained in the foregoing book, that the only
known difference betwixt them lies in this, that in the former case we
conclude from past experience, that the person never will