ighly advantageous if, in the meantime, French
troops garrisoned Viterbo, Velletri and Orvieto.

The declarations of Napoleon were like the despatches of Messrs. Thouvenel
and Gramont, nothing better than empty words--"diplomatic papers," as
Cialdini contemptuously called them. His only object was to lull public
opinion, and let the Piedmontese have the advantage of a _fait accompli_.
Of this there was no room to doubt, when, a little later, he took
officially under his protection the fruit of that criminal aggression
against which he had so loudly protested. Either from weakness or
treachery he was an accomplice, and played a preconcerted game. At first
he may have been sincere in threatening, in the hope of intimidating the
revolution. But when there was question of acting, and he knew that it
defied him, he recoiled. French historians remark, with pain, that this
was a sad alternative, as regards the memory of a man who had the honor to
govern France--the nation, more than all others, renowned for chivalry. It
was also a rebuke to that nation which was so weak as to submit, for
twenty years, to his rule. His friends are brought to the extremity of
demonstrating that he was a coward, if they wish to hinder mankind from
believing that he was a traitor.

Meanwhile, Lamoriciere, by forced marches, on the 16th September, reached
Loretto, from which the enemy withdrew at his approach. His inconsiderable
force counted scarcely 3,000 combatants, viz.: 2,000 infantry, 800
troopers, and 200 artillerymen. But he had given rendezvous at the spot to
the general, Marquis of Pimodan, who brought to him from Terai 2,000
infantry, and arrived a little before night, on the 17th. Thus did it fall
to his lot, with 5,000 men at most, and some old artillery which had not
been sufficiently exercised, to face Cialdini, who had, at the moment,
45,000 men, and was provided with rifled cannon. An engagement on the 18th
was inevitable. The Piedmontese were echeloned along the hills which fill
the declivity from Castelfidardo towards the plain, and extend to within
500 metres of the small river Musone. Their artillery swept the
declivities in all directions. They occupied, in strength, two farms which
were situated, the one 600 metres behind the other, towards the principal
hill. By delaying longer, Lamoriciere would only have exposed himself to
be surrounded and compelled to lay down his arms. At four o'clock in the
morning, the soldiers of the