would occasion to the tranquillity and integrity of the Empire.
He could not but foresee how precarious Austrian rule would become at
Venice, and how impossible it would be to preserve, for any length of
time, the last remains of the Pontifical State, once the King of Piedmont
was master of the rest of the peninsula. The struggle, by being delayed,
could not be avoided. We should only have to undertake it later against a
usurper consolidated by time, and with less manifest evidence of right on
our side. But the embarrassments of the moment engaged the thoughts of his
ministers more than those of the future. All the ministers dissenting from
his opinion, the Emperor made up his mind, after two hours' discussion, to
recall the order which he had signed. The Austrian fleet continued at
anchor in the harbor of Trieste, and the army of the Mincio remained
inactive, although, as may be supposed, indignant, in its quadrilateral,
until Italian unity became a reality, and coalesced with Prussia in order
to expel it.

There must now be recorded another proof of the Emperor Napoleon's double
dealing. On 13th September, M. Thouvenel wrote to Baron de Talleyrand, the
Ambassador of France at Turin: "The Emperor has decided that you must
leave Turin immediately, in order to show his firm determination to
decline all partnership in acts which his counsels, that were given in the
interests of Italy, have not been able to prevent." Vain pretence!
inexorable history accepts not such apologies.

With the exception of the Piedmontese, and perhaps also the Austrian
ministers, there were none in Europe having knowledge of this document,
and the despatch of M. de Gramont to the Consul of Ancona, who did not
believe that a rupture was imminent, if it had not already taken place,
between the Emperor Napoleon and King Victor Emmanuel. General Lamoriciere
was too upright and loyal-minded not to fall into the snare. He wrote
promptly to Mgr. de Merode, asking him to send provisions to Ancona, where
he purposed establishing his quarters, not having had time to prepare for
battle in the open country. He had no disquietude as regarded Umbria. He
left it to be defended by France. He hoped also that General de Goyon
would not confine himself to guarding the walls of Rome, and that he
would, at least, prevent invasion from the direction of Naples, and by way
of the valley of Orvieto. He was confident that France would finally
intervene. And it would be h